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FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS AND THE CLEAN
AIR ACT: SHOULD FINANCIALLY-MOTIVATED
PLAINTIFFS BE BARRED FROM RECOVERING
FEES?
Mark Tannahill*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress set out to clean up the environment in
the 1970s, it included "citizen suit" provisions in most major
environmental legislation,1 including the Clean Air Act (the
"CAA" or the "Act").2 In passing the CAA, Congress aimed "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources
so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population."3 Congress gave the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") the power to
enforce the CAA,4 but also included provisions empowering
private citizens to bring lawsuits to enforce compliance with
the Act.' Congress also made it easier for private citizens to
obtain judicial review of EPA decisions regarding the CAA.6
Along with citizen suits, Congress included fee-shifting
provisions in its environmental legislation.7 Because of the
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law, 2009; B.S. Managerial Economics,
University of California, Davis, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Kenneth
Manaster and the editors of the Santa Clara Law Review for their helpful
comments and assistance. I would also like to thank my parents and brother for
their love and support.
1. Walter B. Russell III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate"
Standard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 308 (1984).
2. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7601.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
6. See id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d).
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inherent complexity and expense of environmental litigation,
citizen suit provisions provide a means for private plaintiffs
to enforce environmental laws and ensure proper
administration without facing the burden of attorneys' fees.'
Of all of Congress's fee shifting provisions, Congress used the
broadest language in the CAA, which authorizes fees to be
assessed "whenever 'appropriate.' "9
Courts of Appeals disagree whether plaintiffs with
financial interests in litigating a CAA citizen suit should be
barred from recovering attorneys' fees.' °  A plaintiffs
financial interests in bringing a CAA citizen suit are most
evident: (1) when a plaintiff brings suit against a business
competitor and alleges a CAA violation,11 and (2) when a
plaintiff seeks to overturn an EPA decision that adversely
affects his or her business. 12 Some circuit courts have held
that Congress never intended the CAA's citizen suit
provisions to benefit financially-interested parties that would
arguably litigate without the prospect of recovering attorneys'
fees. 13 Others conclude that Congress never intended such a
limitation. 4
Part II of this comment begins with a brief discussion of
fee-shifting statutes and their history, followed by a
discussion of the CAA's fee-shifting provisions." Part II then
describes the general approach the United States Supreme
Court and lower courts have employed when determining
whether to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff or
defendant in CAA litigation. 6 Part II concludes with a
description of appellate cases that have addressed the issue of
whether financially-interested plaintiffs are permitted to
recover attorneys' fees under the CAA."1
Part III of this comment explains how the current circuit
split results in uncertainty that can impact a plaintiffs
8. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 326-27.
9. Id. at 309.
10. See, e.g., W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir.
1996); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982).
11. See Fla. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d at 942-43.
12. See W. States Petroleum Ass'n, 87 F.3d at 286.
13. Id.
14. Fla. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d at 943.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
16. See discussion infra Part II.D-F.
17. See discussion infra Part II.G.
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decision of whether and where to file a CAA citizen suit. 18
Part IV analyzes the use of legislative history and additional
factors for determining if attorneys' fees should be granted to
a prevailing plaintiff. 9 Lastly, Part V proposes that a
plaintiffs financial interests should not factor into whether
the plaintiff recovers fees.2" Instead, the United States
Supreme Court should adopt different standards dependent
on the type of citizen suit brought and should use caution
when assessing fees against a private party.2'
II. BACKGROUND
A. The American Rule
United States courts have long adhered to the "American
rule" when determining whether to award attorneys' fees to a
prevailing party.2 2  Under the American rule, 23 even "the
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."24 Although "English
courts have awarded counsel fees to successful litigants for
over 750 years,"2 5 an inherent American notion of fairness
requires each litigant to pay his or her own legal fees.26
As will be further discussed in Part IV,27 scholars have
proffered several different rationales in support of the
American rule.28 First, because "litigation is at best uncertain
one should not be penalized for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit . "..."29 Second, courts fear that if they
routinely award fees to successful parties, "the poor might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
22. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975).
23. The "American rule" is "the general policy that all litigants, even the
prevailing one, must bear their own attorney's fees." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
92 (8th ed. 2004).
24. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 247.
25. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
26. Id. at 685.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
28. See Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 312.
29. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967).
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their rights . ... ,0o Lastly, courts believe that "the time,
expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the
question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would
pose substantial burdens for judicial administration."31
Like many areas of law, exceptions to the rigidity of the
American rule have evolved.32 Courts recognize general
exceptions to the American rule when fee awards are
authorized by contract, defined equitable doctrines, or
statute.33
B. Fee-Shifting Provisions
1. Statutory Fee-Shifting Provisions
The CAA includes statutory exceptions to the American
rule.3 4 These fee-shifting provisions provide a discretionary
mechanism which permits courts to award fees to prevailing
parties.3 5 Statutory fee-shifting systems address three basic
considerations: the incentive effect the availability of fee
awards may have on potential litigants, the belief that parties
should be treated equitably, and the concept of externalities36
and the public benefit produced by the litigation. 7
The numerous federal fee-shifting statutes vary in their
requirements and specificity. Some statutes make fee
awards mandatory, while others leave fee awards to the
court's discretion.39 Most statutes provide that fees may be
awarded only to "prevailing parties," to parties who have
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Ingrid Holmlund, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Nonprevailing
Parties under the Clean Air Act-Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 59 WASH. L. REV.
585, 586 (1984).
33. Id.
34. See Clean Air Act §§ 304(d), 307(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2006).
35. See, e.g., Holmlund, supra note 32, at 588.
36. An "externality" is "[a] social or monetary consequence or side effect of
one's economic activity, causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer
without compensation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 622 (8th ed. 2004). For a
discussion of externalities in the context of environmental regulation, see
Donald J. Kochan, Runoff and Reality: Externalities, Economics, and
Traceability Issues in Urban Runoff Regulation, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 409, 420-23
(2006).
37. Kochan, supra note 36.
38. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983). Over 150 federal
fee-shifting provisions exist. Id.
39. Holmlund, supra note 32, at 587.
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"substantially prevailed," or to parties who are "successful."40
2. The CAA's Fee-Shifting Provisions
The fee-award provision language in the CAA is the
least-specific language used in any of the federal fee-award
provisions." The CAA provides a discretionary mechanism
for courts to award fees, including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees, "whenever it determines that such an
award is appropriate."42 The CAA provision was the first of
its kind and served as a model for at least twelve other
environmental fee-shifting statutes allowing courts to grant
attorneys' fees "whenever... appropriate."43
C. CAA Citizen Suits
Two basic types of citizen suits exist under the CAA: (1)
private enforcement actions against private parties or the
United States government, and (2) actions seeking judicial
review of EPA decisions.44
1. Private Enforcement Actions
Section 304(a)(1) of the CAA allows for private
enforcement actions and provides that "any person" may
commence a civil action against "any person" violating air
quality regulations. 5 Private enforcement actions may also
be brought against the government "where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this Act that is not discretionary with the Administrator. "46
This provision allows private citizens to directly enforce
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Clean Air Act §§ 304(d), 307(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2006).
43. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (2006); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (2006); Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c) (2006); Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (2006); Deepwater Port
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d)
(2006); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (2006); Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(e) (2006); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6305(d) (2006); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. §
8435(d) (2006); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d)
(2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (2006).
44. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 324.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).
46. Id. § 7604(a)(2).
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environmental legislation, an area traditionally reserved for
regulatory agencies." The CAA states that a court "may
award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate."48
2. Judicial Review of EPA Decisions
Section 307(f) of the CAA provides for an action seeking
judicial review of EPA regulations. 49  This provision of the
statute acts as a direct check on the EPA and provides a
higher degree of scrutiny than the EPA's own internal
review.50  Similarly, this provision of the CAA states that a
court "may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines
that such award is appropriate."5  Private enforcement
actions and the ability to seek judicial review of EPA
decisions empower private citizens to enforce compliance with
the CAA.
52
D. The United States Supreme Court's Ruling on CAA Fee-
Shifting Provisions
The United States Supreme Court has provided some
guidance on how to interpret the CAA's fee-shifting
provisions. Since the CAA's language for recovery of fees in
citizen suits does not expressly require a party to prevail, it
was originally uncertain whether courts could shift fees in
47. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 324. For an example of a private
enforcement action, see discussion infra Part II.G.2.b.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d).
49. Id. § 7607.
50. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 326. See William F. Pedersen, Jr.,
Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975).
Pedersen contends that a court's factual review of EPA regulations is "several
times more detailed than the regulations at issue had received since they were
first written." Id at 59. Pedersen argues that a detailed factual review by the
courts is beneficial:
It is a great tonic to a program to discover that even if a regulation can
be slipped or wrestled through various layers of internal or external
review without significant change, the final and most prestigious
reviewing forum of all-a circuit court of appeals-will inquire into the
minute details of methodology, data sufficiency and test procedure and
will send the regulations back if these are lacking.
Id. at 60.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f).
52. See Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 324.
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favor of non-prevailing parties.53 In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club,54 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether it
is appropriate to award attorneys' fees to a party that
achieved no success on the merits of its claims under the
CAA.55 The case involved a section 307 petition for review of
an EPA action that limited emission of sulfur dioxide by coal-
burning power plants.56 The plaintiffs did not prevail on the
merits of their claim, but maintained they were still entitled
to attorneys' fees.57
Although the case dealt specifically with a section 307
suit, the Court noted the close relationship between judicial
review and private enforcement actions.5 " Since both provide
that a court may award fees when "appropriate,"59 the Court
explained that "whatever general standard may apply under
[section] 307(f), a similar standard applies under [section]
304(d)."60 But the Court also noted that section 304 actions
are different because they may be brought "against private
parties."6 The Court elaborated on the distinction:
We do not mean to suggest that private parties should be
treated in exactly the same manner as governmental
entities. Differing abilities to bear the cost of legal fees
and differing notions of responsibility for fulfilling the
goals of the Clean Air Act likely would justify exercising
special care regarding the award of fees against private
parties.62
In its analysis of the issue, the Court noted that when
Congress chooses to depart from the American rule by
53. Holmlund, supra note 32, at 587.
54. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
55. Id. at 682. Notwithstanding their lack of success on the merits, the
plaintiffs urged it was still "appropriate" to award attorneys' fees because they
maintained they had contributed to the goals of the CAA. Id. at 682-83. The
plaintiffs had challenged EPA standards that limited the emission of sulfur
dioxide by coal-burning power plants. Id. at 681. The plaintiffs argued that the
EPA's contacts with private industry tainted the standards it promulgated and
that the EPA lacked authority under the CAA to issue the standards. Id. The
Court of Appeals agreed and awarded the plaintiffs with $91,000 in attorneys'
fees. Id. at 682.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra Parts II.C.1-2.
59. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 691.
60. Id. For a discussion of section 304(d) and 307(f), see supra Part II.C.
61. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 691.
62. Id. at 692 n.12.
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statute, virtually every one of the more than 150 existing
federal fee-shifting provisions predicates fee awards on some
success by the claimant (using phrases like "prevailing
party," "substantially prevailing party," or "successful"). 63
The Court also explained that although English courts have
awarded counsel fees to successful litigants for over 750
years, they have never gone so far as to force a vindicated
defendant to pay the plaintiffs legal expenses.64
The decision in Ruckelshaus mandated that, "absent
some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not
'appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees under
§ 307(f).6 5 Complete success on every issue is not required;
"some degree of success" is sufficient.66 The Court extended
its holding to sixteen other statutes with identical provisions
that allow fees to be awarded when "appropriate.67
E. A Two-Part Rule Emerges
Resulting from the Ruckelshaus decision and its progeny,
a two-part rule for awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs
under the "when appropriate" standard of the CAA has
evolved.68 Ruckelshaus created the first part of the rule,
requiring a prevailing plaintiff to demonstrate "some success
on the merits."69 In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court offered
no clear guidance as to how to determine if awarding fees is
appropriate after some success on the merits has been
reached and, instead, left the issue to lower courts.7°
In answering this question, one common articulation of
the second prong of the rule requires a prevailing plaintiff to
have "contributed substantially to the goals of the Clean Air
Act . . .". Other courts label it as a public interest
component and require the plaintiff "to serve the public
63. Id. at 684-85.
64. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975)).
65. Id. at 694.
66. Id.
67. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 n.1 (1983).
68. E.g., Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1100-03 (10th Cir. 2007)
(applying the two-part test to determine if attorneys' fees should be granted to a
prevailing plaintiff).
69. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694.
70. See id.
71. W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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interest by assisting in the proper interpretation, or
implementation of the statute."72
F. A Note on Prevailing Defendants and Fee-Shifting
Provisions
A dual standard exists for the purpose of awarding
attorneys' fees under environmental fee-shifting statutes,
dependent upon whether the prevailing party is a plaintiff 3
or a defendant.74  "This dual standard generally holds
prevailing defendants to a stricter standard when
determining whether an award is 'appropriate.' 75 When
determining whether a prevailing defendant should recover
fees, courts typically follow the standard set by the Supreme
Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC.7 6
Courts follow Christiansburg as precedent for
environmental cases because of the similarities between both
the fee-shifting provisions and the legislative intent of
environmental and civil rights legislation.7  The
Christiansburg standard states that a prevailing defendant
may recover fees only if they are able to demonstrate that a
"plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith."7 8  Additionally, plaintiffs whose lawyers violate Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure79 or 28 U.S.C. §
1927, ° which prohibit frivolous claims and excessive costs,
are subject to liability for attorneys' fees.8 '
72. Pound, 498 F.3d at 1102.
73. See supra Part II.E.
74. Kerry D. Florio, Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Citizen
Suits: Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 707,
722 (2000).
75. Id.
76. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
77. Florio, supra note 74, at 726. Both forms of legislation share a common
goal in protecting public interests. Id. Although the United States Supreme
Court has yet to apply the Christianburg standard outside the context of civil
rights litigation, based on the similarity between the public interests protected
by civil rights and environmental legislation, the Court would likely affirm
lower courts and apply the standard to environmental fee-shifting provisions.
Id. at 726.
78. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
80. Counsel's Liability for Excessive Costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
81. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-Think-Again" Rule, 1993 BYU L.
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The rationale for denying a prevailing defendant
attorneys' fees derives from the burden that the award would
place on plaintiffs.5 2 The risk of incurring this burden would
severely undercut Congress's efforts to promote citizen
enforcement of federal legislation. 3
G. Discussion of Relevant Circuit Case Law
In order for prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees
from the opposition, the second prong of the rule84 requires
that a plaintiffs lawsuit contribute to the general goals and
public purpose of the CAA. 5 Before reaching this inquiry,
however, some courts have ruled that prevailing plaintiffs are
ineligible for fee awards under the CAA if the plaintiff has a
personal financial interest in bringing the lawsuit.8 6 This
section discusses cases that have addressed the issue of
whether financially-interested plaintiffs should be barred
from recovering fees after successful CAA citizen suits."
1. Circuit Courts Disentitling Attorneys' Fees to
Plaintiffs with Financial Interests
a. D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit was the first to consider the issue in
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch."8  The plaintiffs had
successfully challenged EPA regulations that prevented
significant deterioration of air quality in the nation's "clean
air areas." 9 After prevailing, the plaintiffs moved for an
order compelling the defendant to pay all legal fees.9"
The EPA argued that although the plaintiffs had
prevailed on the issues raised, they did not qualify for
REV. 879, 880-83.
82. See Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422.
83. Id.
84. See supra Part II.E.
85. See W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996);
Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1100-03 (10th Cir. 2007).
86. See W. States Petroleum, 87 F.3d at 286.
87. See discussion infra Part II.G.
88. Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 3. The Court of Appeals had earlier held that some of the EPA's
regulations regarding the air quality of the nation's "clean air areas"
contradicted the CAA's discernible legislative intent. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle,
606 F.2d 1068, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
90. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 3.
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attorneys' fees under the CAA because their position was not
"pro-environment," and because they litigated in furtherance
of their own economic interests and did not need the
possibility of attorneys' fees as an incentive to advocate in the
public interest.91
The court rejected the EPA's first contention, explaining,
"IT]he suggestion that fee awards are limited to parties
asserting 'pro-environment' claims has no support in the
words of the statute or its legislative history."92 The court did
not directly address the EPA's second contention that a
financially-interested plaintiff should not be permitted to
recover attorneys' fees because the plaintiffs also sought fees
under provisions other than the CAA.93 Nonetheless, in a
footnote, the court discussed the EPA's contention and
suggested that the legislative history of the Toxic Substances
Control Act,94 which uses the same "whenever appropriate"
language for the granting of attorneys' fees, should be used
for guidance.9" The legislative history of the Toxic Substances
Control Act states "it is not intended that the provisions
support participation of persons, including corporations ...
that could otherwise afford to participate."96 Additionally,
"[wihether or not the person's resources are sufficient to
enable participation would include consideration of . . .the
likelihood that the person would seek to participate in the
proceeding whether or not compensation was available."9' 7
The dissent argued that a plaintiffs motive for bringing
suit should not be considered because of the complexity and
speculation it entails.9" The dissent noted that a standard
that included motive as a factor "would prohibit an award to a
tenant farmer who seeks to stop a nearby factory from
polluting his water supply, but would allow an award to his
amateur fisherman brother-in-law who visits him on
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (2006).
95. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 7 n.33.
96. Id. (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 32, 855 (1976) (statement of Sen.
Magnuson)).
97. Id. (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 32, 855 (1976) (statement of Sen.
Magnuson)).
98. Id. at 28 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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weekends." 99
b. Ninth Circuit
In Western State Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, the Ninth
Circuit was next to address the issue of whether a plaintiff
with personal financial interests in bringing suit should be
permitted to recover fees after a successful CAA judicial
review action.'0° In this case, the EPA had granted interim
approval of a plan submitted by the State of Washington that
would exempt "insignificant emissions units" from permit
application, monitoring, reporting, and record-keeping
requirements. 10 1 The petitioners, five air-pollutant emitters
and two trade associations of pollutant emitters, brought suit
and successfully challenged the EPA's decision. 102
In addressing the issue, the court agreed with Gorsuch"°3
and reasoned that the legislative history of the Toxic
Substances Control Act'014 gives "the clearest expression of
congressional purpose in enacting statutes of this type."' °'
Using this approach, the court held that a plaintiff with
personal financial motivation cannot recover attorneys' fees
in a judicial review action under the CAA.' 0 '
Additionally, the court explained that the "petitioners do
not assert, nor do we find, that their litigation of this case has
served the public interest in assisting in the interpretation
and implementation of the Clean Air Act." 07 The court found
99. Id.
100. W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 282. "The EPA has allowed states to exempt insignificant
activities and emissions levels from certain requirements in order to reduce the
regulatory burdens on emitters. Subject to EPA approval, each state
determines what activities and emissions levels qualify as insignificant." Id.
102. Id. The Northwest Pulp & Paper Association, the Aluminum Company
of America, the Columbia Aluminum Corporation, Intalco Aluminum
Corporation, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, and Vanalco, Inc.
joined Western States Petroleum Association as petitioners. Id. at 280.
103. Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
104. Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (2006). This
fee-shifting provision uses the same "whenever appropriate" standard for the
granting of attorneys' fees as the CAA. Id.
105. W. States Petroleum Ass'n, 87 F.3d at 286 (citing Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 7
n.33).
106. Id.
107. Id. All parties and the court acknowledged that this litigation was
limited to the EPA's Washington decision and would not affect other CAA
litigation. Id.
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that "the issue under the Act has been relatively narrow and
concerns only the anomalousness of the EPA's Washington
decision.""'8 Further, they held that the petitioners' status as
prevailing parties, standing alone, did not automatically
establish that they had assisted in the proper implementation
of the Act. 10 9
2. Circuit Courts Entitling Attorneys' Fees to Plaintiffs
with Financial Interests
a. Fifth Circuit
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, the Fifth Circuit
was the first to specifically rule on the issue of whether a
financially-interested plaintiff should be permitted to recover
fees after prevailing in a CAA judicial review action.10 The
plaintiff, an electric utility company, had prevailed on a claim
that the EPA had abused its discretion in requiring Florida to
incorporate a "two-year limitation on relief into a state
implementation plan" under the CAA."' After its successful
CAA judicial review action, the plaintiff moved for fees.' 12
The EPA contended "that Congress never intended that
costs and fees be awarded to a large, solvent corporation
whose main motivation in pursuing section 307 litigation is
financial interest; instead, Congress meant only to reward so-
called 'watchdog' or public interest groups whose involvement
in such suits is motivated by public spirit."' 3 In rejecting the
EPA's contention, the court held: "There is no indication that
Congress meant to limit section 307(f) awards to public
interest groups, nor is there any basis for disqualifying a
party from receiving an award merely because that party is
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1982).
111. Id. at 942. "To comply with Florida's EPA-approved state
implementation plan under the CAA, petitioner burned low sulfur fuel oil at its
oil-fired generating plants." Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 581
(5th Cir. 1981). Early in 1979, Exxon Company, U.S.A., petitioner's source of
oil, informed the petitioner "of a significant decrease in the availability of low
sulfur fuel." Id. Petitioner "could not burn available higher sulfur fuel without
exceeding the pollution limits imposed by Florida's" state implementation plan,
so Petitioner filed this lawsuit to seek judicial review of the EPA's regulation.
Id. at 581-82.
112. Fla. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d at 942.
113. Id.
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solvent and has a financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation.""'
In support of its conclusion, the court quoted legislative
history from section 307(f) of the CAA: "'[T]he purposes of the
authority to award fees are . . . not only to discourage
frivolous litigation, but also to encourage litigation which will
assure proper implementation and administration of the Act
or otherwise serve the public interest.' "115 The court
reasoned that "the result of this suit will aid in assuring
'proper implementation and administration of the Act,' [and]
that it will also specifically benefit [the plaintiff] is of no
moment."
116
b. Tenth Circuit
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit considered the issue in
Pound v. Airosol Co., and it was the first to address it with
regards to a CAA private enforcement action." 7 In Pound, a
private plaintiff brought suit against a competitor in the
reptile ectoparasites industry,18 alleging a violation of the
CAA."19 The district court partially granted the plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment, finding that the defendants
violated the Act. 120
After prevailing in its private enforcement action, the
plaintiff moved for fees and argued that by successfully
litigating the citizen suit, an important public service had
been performed and costs should be awarded.12 ' In response,
114. Id. at 943 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 942 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 337 (1977)).
116. Id. at 943.
117. See Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2007).
118. The reptile ectoparasites industry sells aerosol products that eradicate
ectoparasites, such as mites, from reptile skin. Pound v. Airosol Co., 368 F.
Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (D. Kan. 2005).
119. Id.
120. Pound v. Airosol Co., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1085 (D. Kan. 2004). The
CAA "includes provisions to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances."
Id. at 1082. In part, the CAA provides that "[elffective January 1, 1994, it shall
be unlawful for any person to sell or distribute, or offer for sale or distribution,
in interstate commerce . . .any aerosol product or other pressurized dispenser
[that] contains a class II substance." Clean Air Act § 610, 42 U.S.C. §
7671i(d)(1)(A) (2006). The defendant's product admittedly contained a class II
substance, and the manufacturer did not properly submit its application for a
reformulation exemption before the deadline, so therefore its manufacture, sale,
and distribution violated the CAA. Pound, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
121. Pound, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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the defendant argued that the citizen suit was not brought to
further the objectives of the CAA, but rather to protect the
plaintiffs personal economic interest in eliminating a
competitor from the market.122 The district court noted that
the award of fees is clearly discretionary under the CAA and
elected against awarding fees. 23
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered the
defendant to pay attorneys' fees. 124  In its analysis of the
issue, the court acknowledged that the language of section
304(d) 25 and section 307(f)126 of the CAA are identical, and
therefore it is appropriate to treat them similarly. 127 Drawing
on cases that had addressed the issue under section 307(f) of
the CAA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the public interest
element of the CAA had been satisfied, regardless of the
plaintiffs financial motivation for bringing the lawsuit. 128
By bringing this partially successful action, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had "promoted the enforcement of
the Act and assisted the EPA in achieving the Act's statutory
goals.' 1 29  The court held that there was "no basis for
disqualifying a party from receiving an award of fees 'merely
because that party is solvent and has a financial interest in
the outcome of the litigation,' "130 and if the court denied fees
to plaintiffs with a financial interest, it would weaken
enforcement of the Act.131  Denying fees to a financially
interested plaintiff would leave them less inclined to bring
CAA citizen suits, weakening enforcement of the Act. 3 2 In
further support, the court reasoned that "competitors are
most likely to have a substantial financial interest in
ensuring that their peers are CAA compliant, and they are
122. Id. at 1164-65.
123. Id. at 1166.
124. Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 2007).
125. Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006). This provision of the
statute addresses private enforcement actions. See id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f). This provision of the statute addresses judicial
review actions. See id.
127. Pound, 498 F.3d at 1101 n.8 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 691-92 (1983)).
128. Id. at 1102.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir.
1982)).
131. Id.
132. See id.
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also the most informed regarding the products offered.., by
their peers.' 1 33 The court also acknowledged that "no 'special
circumstances' [had] been identified which would cause an
award of attorney fees to be unjust."1 34
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The circuit courts disagree as to whether an award of
attorneys' fees is appropriate in a CAA citizen suit when the
prevailing plaintiff had personal financial interests for
bringing suit. 35  In the context of judicial review actions,
financial interests for bringing suit typically involve the
plaintiffs desire to challenge and overturn EPA decisions that
have an adverse effect on its business. 136 With private
enforcement actions, financial interests typically stem from a
plaintiffs desire to bring harmful litigation against a
competitor. "'
Only three circuits have directly addressed the issue.
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits hold that plaintiffs with a
financial interest in bringing a CAA citizen suit are still
eligible for an award of fees. 3 ' In contrast, the D.C. Circuit
suggests, 3 9 and the Ninth Circuit holds, that a plaintiff with
a financial interest in litigation is ineligible for an award of
fees after a successful CAA citizen suit. 4 ° The other circuits
have yet to address the issue.
A potential Supreme Court ruling on this issue could
have far-reaching effects because at least twelve other
environmental fee-shifting statutes allow courts to grant
attorneys' fees whenever "appropriate."'' At the very least, a
uniform approach would eliminate uncertainty and give
prospective plaintiffs a clear indication of whether they
133. Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007).
134. Id. at 1103.
135. See supra Part II.G.
136. See, e.g., W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 282-83 (9th
Cir. 1996).
137. See Pound, 498 F.3d at 1093-94.
138. See supra Part II.G.
139. Although the D.C. Circuit did not directly rule on the issue, its dicta is of
practical importance because the D.C. Circuit is traditionally the most active
venue in environmental litigation. See Adrienne Smith, Standing and the
National Environmental Policy Act: Where Substance, Procedure, and
Information Collide, 85 B.U. L. REV. 633, 638 (2005).
140. See supra Part II.G.
141. See statutes cited supra note 43.
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should have concerns about their eligibility for CAA fee-
shifting provisions. As it stands, plaintiffs are encouraged to
make all efforts to file CAA citizen suits in the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits since a plaintiffs financial interest in bringing
the lawsuit will not make it ineligible for recovering fees. The
remainder of this comment will discuss and analyze whether
a financially-interested plaintiff should be eligible for the
CAA's fee-shifting provisions,"' and will then propose an
approach the Supreme Court should adopt when presented
with this question in the future.14
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Speculating about Legislative Intent
A difference in opinion regarding the legislative intent of
the CAA serves as the principal reason for the circuit split.
In Western States Petroleum, the court turned to the
legislative history of the Toxic Substances Control Act,144
which uses the same "whenever appropriate" standard as the
CAA, for guidance.'45 There, the legislative history made
clear that the fee-shifting provisions of the Toxic Substances
Control Act were not intended to benefit plaintiffs that
otherwise would have brought suit.'46
In Florida Power, the Fifth Circuit declined to draw
analogies to other statutes and instead focused on the
legislative history of section 307(f) of the CAA: "The purposes
of the authority to award fees are ... not only to discourage
frivolous litigation, but also to encourage litigation which will
assure proper implementation and administration of the Act
or otherwise serve the public interest.' 4  Noting that this
history was silent as to financial interest, and finding that a
solvent party with a financial interest in litigation could still
assist in the proper implementation and administration of the
CAA, the court concluded there was no indication that
142. See discussion infra Part IV.
143. See discussion infra Part V.
144. Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (2006).
145. W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
146. Id. (citing Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 7 n.33).
147. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 1982)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 (1977)).
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Congress intended to limit section 307(f) of the CAA to public
interest groups. 4
8
Although legislative intent can be helpful in statutory
interpretation, one common criticism is that it is often
difficult to discern. 149  When the intent in question must
emanate from a large group of persons, especially a group
with as varied an array of aspirations, agendas, and
motivations as Congress, there is great room for doubt about
the ability to perceive intent.5 ° Even if Congress clearly
expressed its legislative intent, it often only includes
statements from a minority of Congress; therefore, no clear
indication exists as to the intent's pervasiveness.51 The
uncertainty is even more pronounced when courts turn to the
legislative intent of other statutes in order to guide statutory
interpretation. Unless Congress has expressed a desire to do
so, courts run the risk of attributing an inaccurate intent to
Congress.
B. Additional Considerations Regarding Fee-Shifting
Provisions
Although the relevant case law does not delve deeply into
the issue,' 5 ' multiple considerations come into play when
considering statutory fee-shifting provisions. 5 3  One such
consideration is the incentive effect that the availability of fee
awards may have on potential litigants. 54  A second
consideration is the concept that parties should be treated
equitably."' Lastly, a third consideration involves the public
benefit produced by the litigation.' 56
1. Incentive Effect
Common sense dictates that the prospect of recovering
148. Id.
149. See Abby Wright, Comment, For All Intents and Purposes: What
Collective Intention Tells Us about Congress and Statutory Interpretation, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 983, 989 (2006) (discussing courts' usage of legislative intent and
legislative purpose in statutory interpretation). Some even go as far as arguing
that determining legislative intent is impossible. See id. 987-88.
150. Id. at 989.
151. See id. at 1009-11.
152. See supra Part II.G.
153. See Holmlund, supra note 32, at 588.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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fees provides an incentive to bring a lawsuit. With regard to
environmental litigation, statutory fee-shifting systems
acknowledge that "[t]he complex and technical nature of
environmental litigation makes it expensive to prosecute." 57
Furthermore, plaintiffs in environmental litigation typically
"must face groups with vast financial resources, such as the
government and private industry."58  Since the typical
remedy in a CAA citizen suit is an injunction to stop the
violation as opposed to monetary damages, 5 9 an award of
attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs provides them with a
direct means to fund the litigation that otherwise would not
exist.
The CAA's fee-shifting provisions provide another
incentive-an incentive to abide by the Act. 160 In support of
supplementing civil penalties with fee awards, the Act's
potential for fee awards promotes deterrence from violating
the Act. 16  In the context of CAA citizen suits, there is a
justification for using fees as a deterrent against violating the
Act. Even though private plaintiffs technically bring CAA
citizen suits, they involve claims that are fundamentally
public in nature. 62  Successful lawsuits serve the public
interest in maintaining the environment and assuring proper
implementation and administration of the CAA. This can be
said to justify the use of attorneys' fees as a deterrent against
violating the Act. 163
Although there is concern that the incentive created by
providing fees to financially-interested plaintiffs will lead to
an increase in meritless litigation, 64 there are provisions in
place that protect defendants against frivolous CAA
157. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 326-27.
158. Id. at 327.
159. See, e.g., Pound v. Airosol Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164 (D. Kan.
2005).
160. See Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 505-06 (1995) (discussing the deterrence rationale for supplementing civil
penalties with fee awards).
161. Id.
162. Adam Babich, The Wages of Sin: The Violator-Pays Rule for
Environmental Citizen Suits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 219, 223 (2003) (discussing
fee-shifting provisions and Congress's intent to deputize citizens as private
attorney generals).
163. See id. at 223-24.
164. See, e.g., W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir.
1996).
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litigation.165 A prevailing defendant may recover fees if it can
show that a "plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation, even though not brought in subjective
bad faith.' 1 66  Placing the burden too readily on an
unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the prevailing defendant's fees,
however, would substantially undercut the efforts of Congress
to promote the citizen enforcement of federal legislation.
Therefore, this more-protective standard is necessary.'67
Although courts do not use a uniform standard for
determining when prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should
recover fees, this dual standard still creates an incentive for
legitimate citizen suits that promote the law and a
disincentive for meritless litigation. 6 '
Defendants have maintained that plaintiffs with a
financial motive for bringing a private enforcement or judicial
review action under the CAA do not need a fee-shifting
system as an additional incentive. 69 They argue that because
of their own interests in the litigation, plaintiffs in this
situation would bring the lawsuit even without the prospect
of recovering fees. 7° Yet, the shortcoming of arguing that a
plaintiffs financial motive for bringing a CAA citizen suit lies
in the difficulty in determining a plaintiffs motive for
bringing a lawsuit, and whether that motive is significant
enough to induce a plaintiff to bring suit even without the
prospect of recovering fees.'7 '
Courts have criticized inquiring into motive because of its
complexity and speculative nature.172  As previously
mentioned, the dissenting opinion in Gorsuch noted that
considering motive as a factor for determining if fees should
be recoverable "would prohibit an award to a tenant farmer
who seeks to stop a nearby factory from polluting his water
supply, but would allow an award to his amateur fisherman
brother-in-law who visits him on weekends."'73
165. See supra Part IF.
166. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
167. See id. at 422.
168. See Florio, supra note 74, at 707.
169. See, e.g., W. States Petroleum Ass'n, 87 F.3d at 286.
170. See, e.g., id.
171. See Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).
172. See id.
173. Id.
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Although this may be an unlikely example, it highlights
the shortcomings of considering motive for bringing suit. The
farmer would have a clear financial interest in maintaining
his livelihood and bringing a CAA citizen suit to keep his
farm's water supply clean. The next inquiry would be
whether the farmer's financial interest would have led him to
file the lawsuit even if he had no possibility of recovering
attorneys' fees.'74 This would presumably entail a difficult
and open-ended analysis of the farmer's financial status and
whether his own financial incentive in bringing the suit
outweighed the large costs involved in environmental
litigation.'75 With so much at stake financially, a court could
easily find that the farmer would have brought the suit
without the prospect of recovering fees.
This example also highlights the inefficiencies of
including motive as a factor in the analysis of whether a
prevailing plaintiff should recover fees. If personal financial
motive for bringing suit is a factor, a plaintiff in the farmer's
position would be encouraged to shop around for a
"disinterested" plaintiff to bring the lawsuit, such as the
"amateur fisherman brother-in-law." This would undermine
the core reason for permitting citizen suits, which is to allow
private citizens to directly enforce provisions of
environmental legislation, an area traditionally reserved to
regulatory agencies.' 76
Citizen suits are designed to allow enforcement where
environmental legislation is not being properly
administered.'77 Regardless of whether the "interested"
farmer or the "disinterested" brother-in-law brings suit, a
successful CAA citizen suit serves the same public benefit of
abating pollution.
2. Treating Parties Equitably
The notion that parties should be treated equitably
represents a second consideration said to be addressed by
statutory fee-shifting systems.178  Of principal concern is
whether it is fair to break away from the traditional
174. See id.
175. See Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 326-27.
176. Id. at 324.
177. See id. at 324-25.
178. Holmlund, supra note 32, at 588.
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American rule and order a defendant to pay a prevailing
plaintiffs fees.'79  The unique characteristics of judicial
review and private enforcement actions require different
analyses in order to determine what is equitable. 180
a. Equitableness in Judicial Review Actions
After a successful judicial review action of an EPA
decision under the CAA, a prevailing plaintiff may move for
fees pursuant to section 307(f) of the CAA.' 8 ' If the EPA is
ordered to pay fees, the government is able to spread the cost
throughout the tax base. 82 Since the public benefits by the
proper implementation and interpretation of the CAA,
ordering the government to pay attorneys' fees is defensible
on the grounds that the taxpayers ultimately pay for the
benefit they receive.' 8 '
b. Equitableness in Private Enforcement Actions
Assessing fees under section 304(d) of the CAA18 against
private businesses is arguably less defensible.'8 ' Although
businesses can typically spread the cost of attorneys' fees to
the public by raising prices, this method does not uniformly
spread costs in the same manner as taxing the public.186
Here, there is no assurance that consumers represent the
appropriate class to shoulder the entire burden.
87
3. Public Benefit Served by Successful CAA Litigation
Lastly, fee-shifting provisions provide public benefits that
result from successful litigation. 18  Whether "the movant...
serve[d] the public interest by assisting in the proper
interpretation, or implementation of the [Clean Air Act]" has
long been part of the inquiry into whether attorneys' fees
should be assessed in favor of a prevailing plaintiff in CAA
179. See id.
180. See id. at 593.
181. Clean Air Act § 307(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2006).
182. Holmlund, supra note 32, at 593.
183. Id.
184. Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006).
185. See Holmlund, supra note 32, at 593.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 588.
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litigation.'89
In examining the public benefit of successful litigation
under the CAA, it is important to note the distinction
between private enforcement actions and judicial review
actions, as will be discussed below. Provisions providing for
fees in an enforcement action are meant to encourage
abatement of pollution, whereas provisions providing for fees
in judicial review proceedings are meant to encourage proper
implementation and administration of the statute.190
Different public benefits flow from successful private
enforcement actions and successful judicial review actions.
Depending on the circumstances, these public benefits may
help counterbalance the time, difficulty, and costs involved in
determining reasonable attorneys' fees.1 9'
a. Public Benefits of Private Enforcement Actions
Private enforcement actions are designed to encourage
abatement of pollution. 92 Consequently, successful actions of
this type provide the public benefit of enforcing the CAA and
eliminating pollution. 193  Although the magnitude of these
benefits vary, every successful private enforcement action
serves the public interest in maintaining air quality.'94
Additional public benefits emanate from successful
private enforcement actions under the CAA. 19' First, public
officials and agencies may not be able to adequately police the
environment (due to problems such as insufficient funds,
inadequate staff, or lack of expertise), and absent a private
enforcement action, violations would go unpunished. 196
Second, an enforcement agency, such as the EPA, may be
lenient in prosecuting violators "because of political pressure,
alignment with the special interests it was intended to
regulate, or because the agency itself is promoting the activity
that threatens the environment," and a private enforcement
action is necessary in order to properly enforce the CAA. 197
189. Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007).
190. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 324.
191. Id. at 324-25.
192. See id. at 323.
193. See id. at 324-25.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 325.
197. Id. at 324-25.
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Lastly, citizen suits reduce the government's enforcement
burden and save the government money.1 9
b. Public Benefits of Judicial Review Actions
The public benefit of judicial review actions is not as
readily apparent because these actions do not always result
in a direct abatement of pollution.199 Understanding the
benefit of judicial review actions starts with a recognition
that although these lawsuits are technically brought on
behalf of a private plaintiff, they involve claims that are
fundamentally public in nature. °° Similar to legislative
changes, which are capable of providing profound public
benefits," 1 judicial review of EPA actions can have vast
impacts on public health, the environment, and the economy.
If a court overrules an EPA decision as an improper
administration of the CAA, that single action may impact
public health and the environment on a national level.
In addition, judicial review serves as a direct check on
the EPA and provides a higher degree of scrutiny than it
would be subject to under only the EPA's internal review." 2
Judicial review acts to protect the public from improper EPA
action and provides an extra level of review to ensure the
proper application and administration of the CAA.2°3 This is
of special importance because "[wihen cases involve
allegations of administrative lawlessness . .. society has a
keen interest in ensuring that all legitimate points of view
are represented so that courts make fully informed
decisions. 2 °4
C. The "Watchdog" Rationale
In Pound, the Fifth Circuit proffered an additional
rationale to justify an award of fees in favor of a prevailing
plaintiff.2"' The court asserted that "competitors are most
likely to have a substantial financial interest in ensuring that
198. Id. at 325.
199. Id. at 325-26.
200. Babich, supra note 162, at 223.
201. Id.
202. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 326.
203. See id.
204. Babich, supra note 162, at 223.
205. See Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007).
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their peers are CAA compliant, and they are also the most
informed regarding the products offered by their peers."206
The court interpreted a competitors' financial interest as a
positive-it gives it an interest in acting as a "watchdog" to
ensure that its competitors are CAA compliant.2°7 Further,
competitors are informed about the products offered by their
counterparts, and have an understanding of how the CAA
applies to their industry.20 8 Under this approach, where a
plaintiffs financial interest in CAA litigation does not bar
recovery of fees, the court focuses its attention more on the
defendant's status as a violator of the CAA and whether an
award of fees is justified.
V. PROPOSAL
After some success on the merits, courts should not
consider a plaintiffs financial interests for bringing a CAA
citizen suit when determining if it is "appropriate" to award
them attorneys' fees. Environmental legislation includes
citizen suit provisions to ensure and protect the public
interest in maintaining the environment. 20 9 Although parties
with financial interests may have ulterior motivations for
bringing CAA litigation, such motives do not eliminate the
public benefits that flow from the abatement of pollution and
the proper implementation and interpretation of the Act.210
An automatic denial of a fee award to a party with a financial
interest in litigation shifts the focus away from the
defendant's status as a violator of the law and ignores the
public benefit served. Considering a plaintiffs financial
interest begins a complex and speculative journey, first
requiring a determination of the plaintiffs motive for
bringing suit, and then requiring a determination of whether
that motive would have led the plaintiff to bring suit without
the prospect of recovering fees.211
Although courts have attempted to decipher how
legislators intended this issue to be resolved, this has proved
inconclusive since the legislative history of the CAA does not
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 308-09.
210. See Pound, 498 F.3d at 1102.
211. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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specifically address the issue. 2  Until the legislature
specifically addresses the issue, courts should limit their
analysis to the confines of the CAA and not speculate as to
legislative intent. Limiting the analysis to the CAA and its
legislative history, there is no clear indication that Congress
intended to bar financially-motivated plaintiffs from
recovering fees. 213  Further, eliminating the inquiry into
financial motive eliminates any incentive for financially-
interested parties to seek "disinterested" parties to bring
suit.214 This allows for a more direct enforcement of the CAA
and promotes efficiency. 215
Additionally, having a financial interest in litigation can
help a plaintiff fulfill standing requirements in order to bring
a CAA citizen suit. As the Supreme Court notes, "a concrete
and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a legally
protected interest" is required in order to establish standing,
even in the case of environmental citizen suits. 216 Plaintiffs
with a financial incentive to bring CAA litigation are
arguably in a better position to fulfill this requirement than
financially-neutral third parties.
In deciding whether a private plaintiff should recover
fees after successful CAA litigation, as discussed in further
detail below, courts should apply different tests depending
upon whether the lawsuit involves a private enforcement
action or a judicial review action.
A. Test for Private Enforcement Actions
Given the Supreme Court's advice in Ruckelshaus and
the unique characteristics of private enforcement actions,
courts would be wise to use caution when assessing fees
against a private party. Equitableness serves as the primary
concern with assessing fees against a private party; although
the entire public benefits from an abatement of pollution, only
the defendant's customers feel the burden of paying for the
212. See Pound, 498 F.3d at 1102; Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d
941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982).
213. Pound, 498 F.3d at 1102; Fla. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d at 943.
214. See supra Part IV.B.1.
215. See supra Part IV.B.1.
216. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992) (holding that
the plaintiffs did not sufficiently assert imminent injury to have standing and
that plaintiffs' alleged injury was not redressable).
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benefit.217 If the defendant cannot pass the burden to the
public through its customers, the defendant faces the entire
burden on its own.218
However, an inability to pass the financial burden onto
the public does not make it inappropriate to assess fees
against private parties. Assessing fees against a private
party acts as a deterrent against violating the CAA, penalizes
those that violate the law, and creates an incentive for
private parties to bring suit for improper enforcement or
administration of the CAA.219  Additionally, permitting
financially-interested plaintiffs to recover fees embraces the
fact that competitors are in a perfect position to act as a
"watchdog."2 0 Competitors have an incentive to ensure that
their peers comply with the CAA, and they have a unique
understanding of how the CAA applies to their industry.22'
With private enforcement actions, courts should first
consider whether the prevailing plaintiffs lawsuit serves the
public interest in the proper implementation and
interpretation of the CAA.222 In making this determination,
courts should look to the significance of the lawsuit.
Especially in the context of citizen suits against the
government for failure to act, seemingly minor enforcement
actions may take on large-scale significance by establishing
important precedent. When determining whether granting
fees is appropriate, courts should consider the potential
importance of the precedent set by the prevailing plaintiff. In
cases where the public benefit is trivial, courts would be
justified in not awarding fees. This formulation eliminates
any additional incentive for private parties to bring minor
litigation against their competitors just for the sake of
creating a burden and damaging reputation; although a
successful lawsuit hurts its competitors, a prevailing plaintiff
may still have to pay its own fees.
217. Holmlund, supra note 32, at 593.
218. See id.
219. See supra Part I.B.
220. See Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2007).
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., id. Courts already take a similar approach as part of the two-
part inquiry to determine if a plaintiff prevailing in a CAA citizen suit should
recover fees. See, e.g., id. at 1101-02. The two-part test typically asks (1) if
there has been some success on the merits, and (2) if the public interest in the
proper implementation and interpretation of the CAA has been served. Id.
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If the public interest has been served, courts should then
ask whether it is fair to assess fees in favor of the prevailing
plaintiff. Considerations here should include the extent of
the defendant's culpability for the violation, the defendant's
ability to pay fees,223 and any other special circumstances that
would justify not assessing fees. This inquiry would give the
court added discretion in determining whether it is
"appropriate" to stray from the American rule and assess fees
against a private party.
B. Test for Judicial Review Actions
Assessing fees against the government should not entail
as many considerations and safeguards as assessing fees
against a private party. If a plaintiff prevails in a judicial
review action and the court orders the government to pay
fees, the government can pass that cost on to taxpayers.224
Therefore, by levying fees against the government, the public
ultimately pays for the benefit it receives. Since the burden
of paying for the public benefit is more evenly distributed
amongst taxpayers, courts do not need to consider fairness
when assessing fees against the government.
With judicial review actions, courts should only consider
whether the prevailing plaintiffs lawsuit serves the public
interest in the proper interpretation and implementation of
the CAA.226 In addressing the issue, courts should focus on
the significance of the lawsuit and its impact on public health
and the environment.227 The fact that the plaintiff had a
financial motivation for challenging an EPA decision is
inconsequential; as long as the public benefits in a
meaningful way by the lawsuit, courts are justified in
assessing fees against the government.
Had Western States Petroleum used this test, it still
would have reached the same result, and fees would not have
been awarded to the plaintiff.228 Although the plaintiff
223. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 692 n.12 (1983).
224. Holmlund, supra note 32, at 593.
225. Id.
226. See supra Part II.B.
227. See Babich, supra note 162, at 223.
228. See W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996).
Although the court eventually addressed whether the litigation had served the
public's interests, the court had already held the plaintiff ineligible for a CAA
fee award because he had a financial interest for bringing suit. Id.
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prevailed on all issues raised, there were no arguments to
support the notion that the public interest in the proper
implementation and interpretation of the CAA had been
served by the litigation. 29  As a result, even without
considering financial interests, the plaintiff still would not
have been entitled to an award of fees under the CAA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The American rule of parties paying their own fees has a
long tradition in the United States judicial system and is not
discarded lightly.3 ° Nonetheless, drafters of the CAA felt it
necessary to include fee-shifting provisions that would enable
prevailing parties to recover fees. 231' Because of the inherent
complexity and expense of environmental litigation, citizen
suit provisions provide a means for private plaintiffs to
enforce environmental laws and ensure proper administration
without facing the burden of attorneys' fees.232
When determining the appropriateness of awarding fees,
some courts have considered whether the plaintiff had
personal financial interests for bringing suit.233 This inquiry
into a plaintiffs personal financial interest is not supported
by the CAA or its legislative history, and speculating about
congressional intent on this issue has clear shortcomings.234
Successful citizen suits still provide public benefit, regardless
of the plaintiffs reason for initiating litigation.235
In the future, when determining whether awarding fees
to a prevailing plaintiff is appropriate under the CAA, courts
should follow the Supreme Court's advice 36 and use different
approaches dependent upon whether the defendant is a
private party or the government.237  With both private
enforcement and judicial review actions, courts should
continue to look to whether the public purpose in the proper
implementation and interpretation of the CAA has been
229. Id.
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See Clean Air Act §§ 304(d), 307(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2006).
232. Russell & Gregory, supra note 1, at 326-27.
233. See supra Part III.
234. See supra Part IV.A.
235. See supra Part IV.B.3.
236. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 692 n.12 (1983).
237. See supra Part V.
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served. 38  In the case of private enforcement actions,
however, courts should augment this with a determination of
the fairness in assessing fees against a private party.239 Until
the Supreme Court or Congress specifically addresses the
issue, the uncertainty and difference of opinion will persist.
238. See supra Part V.
239. See supra Part V.A.
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